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 “The People Surrender Nothing”: 
Social Compact Theory, Republicanism, and 
the Modern Administrative State 
Joseph Postell* 
The famous administrative law scholar and professor, Louis Jaffe, wrote 
that “delegation of ‘lawmaking’ power is the dynamo of modern govern-
ment.”1  The various agencies of the modern administrative state are routinely 
granted broad mandates to enact rules that carry the force of law.2  This fact 
has generated a constitutional controversy for the past several decades, in 
which it is asserted that only Congress, and not regulatory agencies, may 
exercise legislative powers.3  The importance of this controversy to the mod-
ern administrative state is clear: if the Constitution forbids Congress from 
delegating legislative power to administrative agencies, and agencies today 
exercise legislative power, much (but not all) of the modern administrative 
state is unconstitutional. 
Scholars on both sides of the issue recognize the ramifications.  Even 
though the Supreme Court has shown little interest in reopening the debate 
over the delegation of legislative power to administrative agencies, scholars 
have published dozens of articles on the nondelegation doctrine in recent 
years.4  If modern history is any indication, there is little prospect that atten-
tion to the nondelegation doctrine in scholarship and literature will subside in 
the near future. 
Yet important and inaccurate myths about the nondelegation doctrine 
still prevail in spite of this ongoing scholarly attention.  This Article aims to 
establish the proper foundation for the nondelegation principle.  While this 
principle is typically linked to the theory of the separation of powers, the true 
foundation of the nondelegation principle is the idea of the social compact 
and the related theory of republican government.  To the extent that the mod-
ern administrative state transfers legislative powers to administrative officers 
who are not vested with those powers by the people through their Constitu-
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 1. Louis L. Jaffe, An Essay on the Delegation of Legislative Power: I, 47 
COLUM. L. REV. 359, 359 (1947). 
 2. See PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 2 (2014). 
 3. See id. at 3. 
 4. Travis Mallen, Rediscovering the Nondelegation Doctrine Through a Unified 
Separation of Powers Theory, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 419, 419 (2005) (observing in 
2005 that “[i]n the last decade, no fewer than fifty articles have been published on the 
subject” of nondelegation). 
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tion, and who are not elected by the people either directly or indirectly, it 
violates these cardinal principles of American constitutionalism. 
The Article’s argument proceeds in four parts.  Part I provides an over-
view of the scholarly arguments in defense of the nondelegation doctrine.  It 
describes three arguments in favor of the nondelegation doctrine: the separa-
tion of powers, political accountability, and constitutional text.  Part II argues 
that social compact theory – not separation of powers, accountability, or con-
stitutional text – is the true foundation of the nondelegation principle.  Part III 
connects the theory of the social compact to the basic principles of republican 
government, which require that legislative powers are exercised by the repre-
sentatives of the people chosen through elections.  Part IV concludes by ten-
tatively discussing the implications of this argument for contemporary admin-
istrative government. 
I.  COMPETING FOUNDATIONS OF THE NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE 
Defenders of the nondelegation doctrine generally offer one of three ar-
guments: the separation of powers, public accountability, or the text of the 
U.S. Constitution.5  The most common argument invokes the separation of 
powers.6  This position holds that Congress cannot delegate power to admin-
istrative agencies because the legislative, executive, and judicial powers must 
remain separate.7  It is often argued that delegating legislative power to ad-
ministrative agencies, which typically exercise executive and sometimes judi-
cial powers, violates this principle.8 
Examples of the separation of powers argument abound.  For instance, 
Randolph May argues that “the public interest standard” typically inserted in 
regulatory statutes “is inconsistent with the separation of powers principles 
vindicated in our constitutional system through the nondelegation doctrine.”9  
Similarly, Travis Mallen writes, “The nondelegation doctrine is a function of 
separation of powers.”10  Mallen’s defense of the doctrine rests on what he 
calls the principle of “institutional competence,”11 which argues that only the 
 
 5. See Marci Hamilton, Representation and Nondelegation: Back to Basics, 20 
CARDOZO L. REV. 807, 807 (1999); DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT 
RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION 9 
(1993); Gary S. Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 335 
(2002) [hereinafter Lawson, Original Meaning]. 
 6. See Hamilton, supra note 5, at 807. 
 7. See id. 
 8. See id. 
 9. Randolph May, The Public Interest Standard: Is It Too Indeterminate to Be 
Constitutional?, 53 FED. COMM. L.J. 427, 429 (2001) (May’s analysis of the nondele-
gation doctrine from the Framers’ perspective consists of a discussion of how the 
Framers, primarily Madison, implemented the advice of Montesquieu with regard to 
dividing and separating powers). 
 10. Mallen, supra note 4, at 421. 
 11. Id. at 421–22, 432. 
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legislative branch is competent to legislate, and delegation of power “grants 
the Executive a power to act in a manner wholly divorced from the Execu-
tive’s independent institutional competencies.”12  Marci Hamilton grounds 
her defense of the nondelegation doctrine in the fact that “the Framers’ de-
bates focused on finding the appropriate balance of power” in the federal 
government.13  Therefore, in a nondelegation inquiry, “the question to be 
asked is whether each branch is checking the others in ways that are construc-
tive for effective government and for liberty.”14  And delegation of power 
undermines the legislature’s ability to deliberate, as well as the executive’s 
capacity for “exercising decisive leadership” and checking “the legislature’s 
tendency to cabal.”15  Martin Redish argues that “[t]he system of separation 
of powers was established in order to prevent undue accretion of political 
power in one branch.  Abandonment of the nondelegation doctrine effectively 
permits the executive branch to accumulate an almost unlimited amount of 
power.”16 
The link between nondelegation and the separation of powers also ap-
pears in Supreme Court opinions.   In Loving v. United States, the Court en-
gaged in an extensive discussion of Montesquieu and the separation of pow-
ers in the context of a delegation challenge, noting that “[a]nother strand of 
our separation-of-powers jurisprudence, the delegation doctrine, has devel-
oped to prevent Congress from forsaking its duties.”17  Justice Thomas, the 
member of the Supreme Court who seems most interested in enforcing the 
nondelegation principle, announced in Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns 
that he “would be willing to address the question whether our delegation ju-
risprudence has strayed too far from our Founders’ understanding of separa-
tion of powers.”18  More recently, in 2015, Justice Thomas argued in a con-
curring opinion:  
 12. Id. at 432. 
 13. Hamilton, supra note 5, at 810. 
 14. Id. at 818. 
 15. Id. 
 16. MARTIN REDISH, THE CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL STRUCTURE 142 (1995).  
See also Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Reconsidering the Nondelegation Doctrine: 
Universal Service, the Power to Tax, and the Ratification Doctrine, 80 IND. L.J. 239, 
260 (2005) (according to the Court, “Provided that Congress establishes an ‘intelligi-
ble principle’ that limits an agency’s decisionmaking power, the delegation does not 
violate the separation of powers”); id. at 265 (“As a formal matter, however, the non-
delegation doctrine remains a part of the separation of powers doctrine.”); JOHN 
PRESTON COMER, LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE 
AUTHORITIES 115 (photo. reprint 2003) (1927) (the view that the nondelegation doc-
trine is intertwined with separation of powers theory goes as far back as John Preston 
Comer’s Legislative Functions of National Administrative Authorities, originally 
published in 1927, which states that the nondelegation doctrine is argued “under the 
name of the separation-of-powers theory”). 
 17. Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 758 (1996). 
 18. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 487 (2001) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (emphasis added). 
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We have too long abrogated our duty to enforce the separation of 
powers required by the Constitution.  We have overseen and sanc-
tioned the growth of an administrative system that concentrates the 
power to make laws and the power to enforce them in the hands of a 
vast and unaccountable administrative apparatus that finds no home in 
our constitutional structure.19 
Thus, the separation of powers argument is prominent in Supreme Court 
jurisprudence and legal commentary. 
A second approach to defending the nondelegation doctrine invokes the 
principle of accountability.  This position asserts that the delegation of legis-
lative power to unelected and unaccountable bureaucrats undermines the ac-
countability of government to the people and therefore the core democratic 
principles upon which the Constitution rests.  David Schoenbrod has made 
this argument most forcefully.  Focusing on the harmful effects of delegation 
on democracy and the policy problems that result from delegation, he writes, 
“Delegation can shield our elected lawmakers from blame for harming the 
public not only when a regulatory program . . . serves no legitimate public 
purpose, but also when a regulatory program should serve an important pub-
lic purpose.”20  Delegation, he continues, has “the political consequence of 
allowing officials to duck responsibility for costs” and “helps to insulate 
Congress and the White House from political accountability for supporting 
laws that are harmful to the broad public interest.”21  This phenomenon of 
“blame-shifting” takes place because a law appears to bestow benefits such as 
clean air without any cost; the costs of acquiring clean air through govern-
ment regulation follow years afterwards, and the public believes administra-
tive agencies, not the legislature, produce it.22  Furthermore, this argument 
runs, one cannot reply that agencies are accountable to the people because 
they are accountable to Congress, for “the agency is ordinarily unaccountable, 
except for egregious political sins, to most of Congress and therefore to most 
of the people.”23  In other words, accountability to Congress only prevents 
egregious agency actions, while the rest of administrative policymaking flies 
under the radar. 
The theme of delegation and democracy became more prominent in 
Schoenbrod’s subsequent work criticizing delegation of lawmaking power to 
agencies.  Responding to the claims of some of his critics that delegation does 
not run afoul of the principle of democratic accountability, Schoenbrod 
writes, “The effort to square delegation with democracy is pervasively futile 
because the drive for delegation, from the beginning of the twentieth century,  
 19. Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.R.s, 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1254–55 (2015) 
(Thomas, J., concurring). 
 20. SCHOENBROD, supra note 5, at 9. 
 21. Id. at 10, 55.  See also MORRIS P. FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE 
WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT 37–47 (1989). 
 22. SCHOENBROD, supra note 5, at 82, 85–94. 
 23. Id. at 101. 
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stemmed from a desire to reduce government’s accountability to ordinary 
voters.”24  He argues that “[f]rom its inception, the core purpose of delegation 
was to undercut democratic accountability.”25  Schoenbrod provides historical 
evidence that shows the progressives’ rejection of democracy in favor of 
“elitist” rule by bureaucratic experts was the primary cause of the abandon-
ment of the nondelegation doctrine in the twentieth century.26  The entire 
purpose of the delegation of power was to undermine democratic accountabil-
ity and to allow experts, not generalist politicians, to make policy.27 
This emphasis on democratic accountability is characteristic of many 
scholars who defend the nondelegation doctrine.28  Martin Redish’s nondele-
gation principle of “political commitment” also rests upon the concept of 
democratic accountability, as well as separation of powers.29  Redish argues 
that the nondelegation doctrine “embodies fundamental elements of American 
political theory – namely accountability and checking – which are seriously 
undermined by its abandonment.”30  According to Redish, the nondelegation 
doctrine is the principle that emerges where accountability and separation of 
powers principles converge.31  It is here that Redish articulates the “political 
commitment” principle, which states that the best way to devise a principle 
for enforcing the doctrine is to “return to the first principles of our system of 
separation of powers by asking simply whether congressional legislation 
evinces a sufficient political commitment to enable the voters to judge their 
representatives.”32  Redish implies that accountability and separation of pow-
ers principles are inextricably linked, although it seems possible to imagine 
an accountable government where powers are combined or a government of 
separated powers which is nevertheless unaccountable to the people.33 
 
 24. David Schoenbrod, Delegation and Democracy: A Reply to My Critics, 20 
CARDOZO L. REV. 731, 732 (1999). 
 25. Id. at 734. 
 26. Id. at 733. 
 27. Id. at 733–34. 
 28. Id. at 759.  While Schoenbrod is only one of many defenders of the nondele-
gation doctrine who cites accountability as a primary concern, he does not view 
“democratic accountability” as a sufficient argument to defend the nondelegation 
doctrine as a principle of constitutional law, stating that “[t]he argument that the Con-
stitution forbids delegation is based upon the text and context of the Constitution, the 
understandings of the Framers, and the judicial interpretations closest in time to the 
Constitution’s adoption. . . . The point is that the democracy-based argument is not 
the primary argument for the claim that the Constitution forbids delegation, but rather 
one of the reasons why the Framers intended the Constitution to forbid delegation.  It 
is the proponents of delegation who have placed critical reliance on democracy.”  Id. 
 29. REDISH, supra note 16, at 136. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 135–62. 
 32. Id. at 154. 
 33. Id. 
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Under Redish’s political commitment principle, “a reviewing court 
would ask itself whether the voters would be placed in a substantially better 
position to judge their representatives by learning whether they had voted for 
or against the challenged legislation.”34  If the answer is “no,” then the legis-
lation probably violates the nondelegation doctrine.35  Thus, for Redish, the 
clue to enforcing the nondelegation doctrine is accountability – namely, 
whether a legislator could be held accountable by voters based on the legisla-
tion that was enacted.36  As with the separation of powers defense of the non-
delegation doctrine, the political accountability argument is widespread, but 
Redish and Schoenbrod offer perhaps the most developed accountability ar-
guments in legal scholarship.37 
A third argument for the nondelegation doctrine is textually based in Ar-
ticle 1, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution, which declares that “[a]ll legisla-
tive powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress.”38  The use of the 
word “shall” implies a constitutional obligation that Congress alone exercises 
the legislative powers enumerated in Article I.  Yet because, as Gary Lawson 
has observed, “the Constitution contains no express provision forbidding 
delegation,”39 more analysis is needed to enforce the nondelegation principle 
than mere reliance on Article I’s Vesting Clause. 
Nondelegation defenders respond that there is nothing in Congress’s 
enumerated powers to support the delegation of legislative power from Con-
gress to administrative agencies.40  Gary Lawson and Douglas H. Ginsburg 
have offered the two most prominent examples of this defense of the non-
delegation doctrine.41  This argument proceeds in three steps.  First, because 
the Constitution creates a government of limited and enumerated powers, the 
power to delegate must be based on some positive enumeration of power to 
 
 34. Id. at 154–55. 
 35. Id. at 155. 
 36. Id. at 154–55. 
 37. See also Alexander Bickel, Congress, the President, and the Power to Wage 
War, 48 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 131, 137 (1971) (Bickel states that the nondelegation 
doctrine “is concerned . . . with the sources of policy,” especially “the crucial joinder 
between power and broadly based democratic responsibility, bestowed and discharged 
after the fashion of representative government.  Delegation without standards short-
circuits the lines of responsibility that make the political process meaningful.”). 
 38. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
 39. Patrick Garry, Accommodating the Administrative State: The Interrelation-
ship Between the Chevron and Nondelegation Doctrines, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 921, 926 
(citing Lawson, Original Meaning, supra note 5, at 238). 
 40. Gary Lawson, Discretion as Delegation: The “Proper” Understanding of the 
Nondelegation Doctrine, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 235, 238 (2005) [hereinafter Law-
son, Discretion]. 
 41. See id.; see also Douglas Ginsburg, Legislative Powers: Not Yours to Give 
Away, HERITAGE FOUND., 
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/01/legislative-powers-not-yours-to-
give-away (last visited Oct. 20, 2016). 
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Congress.42  Lawson argues, “Congress, as with all federal institutions, can 
only exercise those powers conferred upon it by the Constitution.  That is 
what is meant by ‘enumerated powers.’”43  Second, there is no such grant of 
authority to delegate explicitly set forth in the text of the Constitution.44  As 
Lawson writes, “Obviously, if the Constitution expressly said, ‘Congress may 
delegate legislative power,’ that would be the end of the story.”45  But 
“[t]here is no express delegation clause,” and therefore, “[t]he question is 
whether the power to delegate can be found in some subtler form.”46 
Third, these scholars argue, there is no ground for delegation in the 
Necessary and Proper Clause because delegation is neither necessary nor 
proper.47  In Lawson’s view, “[S]tatutes vesting undue discretion in executive 
(or any other) actors exceed Congress’s enumerated power under the Sweep-
ing Clause of Article I.”48  They “are either not necessary, not proper, or both. 
. . . [T]hey are not ‘proper’ when they charge the President with excessive 
discretion. . . . That is what the traditional nondelegation doctrine rests upon, 
and it is right.”49  Therefore, this third argument for the nondelegation doc-
trine boils down to the text of the Constitution and the understanding of the 
Constitution as establishing a limited government.  As Lawson argues, “The 
central question with respect to the nondelegation doctrine is therefore: can 
laws conferring discretion on executive actors ever fail to be ‘necessary and 
proper for carrying into Execution’ federal powers?”50  This analysis places 
great demands on courts tasked with determining what constitutes excessive 
executive discretion, but Lawson notes that many other tests for constitution-
ality require similar judicial judgment.51 
Ginsburg’s analysis proceeds similarly.  In explaining Article I, Section 
1 of the Constitution, Ginsburg writes that “[t]he Constitution declares that 
the Congress may exercise only those legislative powers ‘herein granted.’  
That the power assigned to each branch must remain within that branch, and 
may be expressed only by that branch, is central to the theory.”52  Moreover, 
“This basic principle is enforced by the Constitution’s scheme of enumerated 
powers.”53  Thus, Ginsburg – like Lawson – starts by citing the Constitution’s 
text as the ground of the nondelegation doctrine and proceeds to argue that 
the doctrine of enumerated powers supports his reading of the text.54  He  
 42. Lawson, Discretion, supra note 40, at 238. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Lawson, Original Meaning, supra note 5, at 345. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. See id. at 334–45; see also Lawson, Discretion, supra note 40, at 237. 
 48. Lawson, Discretion, supra note 40, at 237. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 241–42. 
 51. Lawson, Original Meaning, supra note 5, at 353–95. 
 52. Ginsburg, supra note 41. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
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adds, “Nor can the Congress confer such a lawmaking power [on the Presi-
dent or the courts] by statute, for the simple reason that the Congress has no 
enumerated power to create lawmakers.”55  If there were an enumerated pow-
er to delegate legislative power, under this analysis, it would be acceptable 
for Congress to delegate legislative power. 
This third argument on behalf of nondelegation, therefore, is not 
grounded in core principles like separation of powers or democratic account-
ability.  Rather, it is based on the original meaning of the constitutional text.  
As Lawson writes, the purpose of his work is to show “that the traditional 
nondelegation doctrine, at least in its most general guise, has a solid constitu-
tional grounding.”56  If the text of the Constitution were changed, this objec-
tion to delegation would vanish, as it is based merely on the positive language 
of the Constitution. 
II.  SOCIAL COMPACT THEORY AND NONDELEGATION 
Each of the three predominant arguments in favor of the nondelegation 
doctrine is flawed.  However, this does not mean that the opponents of the 
nondelegation doctrine are correct.  There is a solid foundation for the non-
delegation doctrine, but it is found in social compact theory, rather than the 
separation of powers, accountability, or mere adherence to the text of the 
Constitution.  While defenders of nondelegation are correct, they tend to rest 
their arguments on false foundations.  This Part shows that defenders of the 
doctrine have failed to adequately explain the Founders’ doctrine and seeks to 
unite the argument for the nondelegation doctrine on different footing. 
A.  Deficiencies in Current Defenses of the Nondelegation Doctrine 
Those who connect the nondelegation doctrine to the Constitution’s sep-
aration of powers are understandably misled by the example of the American 
experience.  In our modern administrative state, Congress typically transfers 
its power to administrative agencies in which legislative and executive pow-
ers are combined.57  Such a practice violates Montesquieu’s famous maxim 
that “[w]hen the legislative and executive powers are united in the same per-
son, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty; because ap-
prehensions may arise, lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyranni-
cal laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner.”58  Thus, as a practical mat-
ter, the delegation of legislative power to the executive in the American expe-
rience has resulted in a violation of the separation of powers.  Hence, as we 
 
 55. Id. 
 56. Lawson, Discretion, supra note 40, at 236. 
 57. Lawson, Original Meaning, supra note 5, at 358. 
 58. 1 BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, Of the Laws Which Establish Political Liberty 
with Regard to the Constitution, in THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 149, 151–52 (Franz 
Neumann ed., Thomas Nugent trans., 1949). 
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have seen, many defenders of the nondelegation doctrine point to the separa-
tion of powers as the principle behind the doctrine. 
However greatly the modern administrative state violates the separation 
of powers in practice, it is still true that not all delegations of power in theory 
violate the separation of powers.  Consider a simple example of a delegation 
of legislative power to an administrative body that only promulgates rules, 
which are then executed by a different agency.  This would not violate the 
need for separation of powers, but it would violate the nondelegation doc-
trine.  In theory, Congress might create an agency and grant it purely legisla-
tive powers, preserving a separation of powers, despite the delegation of leg-
islative power.  Therefore, not all delegations of power violate the separation 
of powers, which means that the nondelegation doctrine cannot be justified 
simply on the basis of the separation of powers.  In fact, the principle of sepa-
ration of functions in administrative law is designed to preserve delegation 
without violating the separation of powers maxim. 
The argument that the nondelegation doctrine is derived from principles 
of democratic accountability is also subject to several objections.  First, dem-
ocratic accountability is not explicitly enumerated as a constitutional princi-
ple.59  The Framers’ theories of electoral representation and consent of the 
governed do not translate universally into greater democratic accountability.  
The requirement that government be responsive to the people is part of the 
Founders’ principle of representation, but this requirement is also limited by 
the same principle.  Representation, as the next Part notes, was frequently 
defended on the grounds that it would make lawmakers less accountable to 
the impulses of the public.60  To argue against the delegation of legislative 
power on the grounds that it renders government unaccountable creates con-
fusion about the extent of democratic accountability in the Founders’ own 
scheme of representation.  The Framers intended representation to be a mid-
dle ground between direct or pure democracy and a government that did not 
provide for the consent of the governed.61  In general, the Framers held pure 
democracy in contempt and emphasized the usefulness of representation as a 
way to “refine and enlarge the public views,” rather than blindly follow 
them.62 
Moreover, arguments against the delegation of legislative power based 
on principles of democratic accountability suggest that the problem could be 
solved, or at least its effects mitigated, by simply rendering administrative 
rulemaking more accountable.  In fact, this has been one of the primary tasks 
of administrative law over the past fifty years.  Put simply, if the delegation 
of legislative power renders government less accountable, the solution may  
 59. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 63, at 424–25 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke 
ed., 1961) [hereinafter MADISON, FED. 63] (explaining the republican principle of 
responsibility as “sometimes necessary as a defense to the people against their own 
temporary errors and delusions”). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
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not be to abandon the delegation of legislative power but to “democratize” the 
administrative state through various legal doctrines, granting power to indi-
viduals to participate in and influence the administrative process. 
The textualist argument for the nondelegation doctrine, which maintains 
that the theory of a limited constitution of enumerated powers (coupled with 
the correct analysis of the “Sweeping Clause”) prevents the delegation of 
legislative power, is more defensible but ultimately insufficient.  In fact, 
Lawson acknowledges this, writing that “[i]t would take a better philosopher 
than I to show that as a matter of normative political theory,” the nondelega-
tion doctrine is defensible.63  His aim, in his words, is “more modest” – 
namely, “to establish . . . that the Constitution prohibits the kind of delegation 
of legislative authority that is at the heart of modern administrative govern-
ance.”64  As he admits, “[T]o show that a practice is identifiably unconstitu-
tional is not to show, as a matter of political theory, that it ought to be aban-
doned.”65  In short, by relying simply on the text of the Constitution, this po-
sition fails to provide a robust normative defense to those who would ask why 
the Framers might have included a nondelegation principle in the Constitu-
tion they drafted and ratified.  The textual basis for the nondelegation doc-
trine is a product of the theory behind it, the true ground of the nondelegation 
doctrine, which is the Founders’ principle of the social compact. 
B.  The Social Compact: The True Ground of the Nondelegation Doc-
trine 
The Framers of the Constitution repeatedly referred to the idea of the 
social compact, and nearly every major Founder subscribed to the principle.66  
Social compact theory maintains that sovereignty – the power to create and 
establish governments and to vest them with power – resides in the people 
alone.67  Governments derive their just powers from the consent of the gov-
erned, who must agree to vest the government with its powers.68   Further-
more, social compact theory holds that the sovereignty of the people is inal-
ienable.69  That is, the people may not transfer their power and responsibility 
to govern themselves to any other body.  When they vest powers in a gov-
ernment, they are not giving their sovereignty away but merely delegating it  
 63. Gary Lawson, Delegation and the Constitution, 22 REG. 23, 23–24 (1999) 
[hereinafter Lawson, Delegation], 
http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/1999/7/delegation.pdf. 
 64. Id. at 24. 
 65. Id. at 23–24. 
 66. See Edward J. Erler, From Subject to Citizens: The Social Compact Origins 
of American Citizenship, in THE AMERICAN FOUNDING AND THE SOCIAL COMPACT 
163, 163 (Ronald J. Pestritto & Thomas G. West eds., 2003). 
 67. Id. 
 68. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
 69. Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1454 
(1987). 
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to a trustee who acts on their behalf.  Those officers who hold government 
power, consequently, are merely the temporary holders of power, rather than 
the new owners of the powers vested in them.  The people, as the sole foun-
tain of authority, delegate power to the government, but only in a limited 
way, connected to the specific ends for which the people designate that power 
to be exercised. 
The nondelegation doctrine follows directly from the theory of a social 
compact.  According to social compact theory, only those who possess politi-
cal power may delegate it.70  Since the representatives of the people never 
own the powers they exercise – because the people cannot alienate those 
powers – they may not delegate those powers.  John Locke linked the two 
ideas explicitly in his assertion of the nondelegation principle.71  In his words, 
the legislative power is “sacred and unalterable in the hands where the com-
munity [has] once placed it.”72  “The power of the Legislative,” he continued, 
is “derived from the People by a positive voluntary Grant and Institution” and 
“can be no other, than what that positive Grant conveyed, which being only to 
make laws, and not to make legislators, the Legislative can have no power to 
transfer their Authority of making Laws, and place it in other hands.”73  Be-
cause legislative power is “but a delegated power from the people, they who 
have it cannot pass it over to others.”74  This argument against the delegation 
of legislative power is based on the idea of the social compact.  The social 
compact assumes that, because sovereignty is inalienable, the people can only 
transfer the power “to make laws, and not to make legislators.”75  If the peo-
ple were to give another body the power to make legislators, they would be 
acting contrary to the basic principles and purposes of government.76  Just as 
the people can never transfer power over their natural rights to government, 
they also cannot transfer their sovereignty to government.77 
In other words, according to social compact theory, only the people can 
delegate legislative power, and when legislative power is delegated by the 
people to their agents in the legislature, the legislature cannot delegate its 
powers away because legislative power was never fully alienated by the peo-
ple.  As Larry Alexander and Saikrishna Prakash explain, 
[W]hen the legislature attempts to delegate lawmaking authority to a 
third party, the third party’s rules are nullities because the third party 
was not chosen by the people to exercise the legislative power, and the 
 
 70. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 141 (C.B. McPherson ed., 
1980). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 134. 
 73. Id. at 141. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
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people (according to Locke) never authorized a further delegation of 
legislative power to others.78 
Alexander and Prakash are correct, but Locke’s prohibition on delega-
tion is even stronger than they suggest.  According to Locke and social com-
pact theory, the people cannot authorize a further delegation of legislative 
power to others, because only those who possess legislative power fully may 
delegate it, and only the people can fully possess legislative power. 
One might respond to this argument by using the analogy of a gift.  
When one gives a gift, the recipient is not prohibited from giving the gift to 
another.  Why should we understand political power differently?  The answer 
is that, unlike a gift, political power always resides in the people and cannot 
be given away or transferred to others.  It may only be delegated.  That dele-
gation creates a principal-agent or trustee relationship, which forbids the fur-
ther delegation of power.  Only principals may delegate power, and the repre-
sentatives of the people cannot become principals since they never fully pos-
sess power. 
The Founders’ agreement with this position is implied in Federalist 
84.79  In that essay, Alexander Hamilton defended the omission of a bill of 
rights in the original Constitution because “bills of rights are in their origin, 
stipulations between kings and their subjects[,] reservations of rights not sur-
rendered to the prince.”80  In other nations, bills of rights were necessary to 
specify the particular powers that the people retained.81  The presumption in 
those nations was that the government possessed sovereignty, and the gov-
ernment’s political powers were unlimited except as to what was expressly 
enumerated in the bill of rights.82  The foundation for this presumption was 
the principle that sovereignty rested in the government and not in the people; 
thus, the people were only entitled to the rights that were stipulated in the bill 
 
 78. Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Reports of the Nondelegation Doc-
trine’s Death Are Greatly Exaggerated, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1297, 1322 (2003).  Alex-
ander and Prakash accurately address the nondelegation doctrine at least in part by 
discussing the Founders’ social compact theory.  Id.  Yet they also claim that “[w]e 
have not sought to prove that the conventional nondelegation doctrine is the one en-
shrined in the Constitution.”  Id. at 1328 (emphasis added).  They do not claim to 
show that “the Constitution enshrines Locke’s view about the limits on legislative 
power.”  Id. at 1323.  The aim of this Article, in part, is to show that the Founders did 
agree with Locke’s formulation and did enshrine it in the Constitution.  Another au-
thor who notes the social compact argument on behalf of the nondelegation doctrine 
is Patrick Garry.  See Patrick Garry, Accommodating the Administrative State, 38 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 921, 927 (2006).  Yet Garry only devotes three sentences to the con-
cept, as it is only peripherally related to the thesis of his article.  Id. 
 79. THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 587 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 
1961). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
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of rights, the rights that the government had agreed to reserve for the peo-
ple.83 
But a bill of rights, Hamilton argued, is unnecessary in a government 
based on the principles of the Declaration of Independence.84  Bills of rights, 
he explained, “have no application to constitutions professedly founded upon 
the power of the people, and executed by their immediate representatives and 
servants.  Here, in strictness, the people surrender nothing, and as they retain 
everything, they have no need of particular reservations.”85  In governments 
founded upon the power of the people – that is, through a social compact – 
sovereignty must be understood differently.  Hamilton argued that the people 
never actually give away power to the government.86   In delegating power to 
the government, the people are always understood to retain their sovereignty.  
They surrender nothing and retain everything. 
Therefore, according to social compact theory, the people are the foun-
tain of sovereignty and are unable to relinquish or alienate their sovereignty.   
Those who hold political power as representatives of the people are merely 
the trustees, rather than the possessors of power.  And this argument was re-
peated throughout the founding period.  For instance, James Burgh’s Political 
Disquisitions affirmed that “[w]hen we elect persons to represent us in par-
liament (says a judicious writer) we must not be supposed to depart from the 
smallest right which we have deposited with them.  We make a lodgment, not 
a gift; we entrust, but part with nothing.”87  Instead of thinking of political 
power as a gift, transferred out of the hands of the people and given away to 
public officers, Burgh and the Founders thought of political power as a lodg-
ment, which officers were allowed to borrow but never to fully possess.  
Burgh asserts that the power of government “is only borrowed, delegated, and 
limited by the intention of the people.”88 
Several other Framers reiterated the basic social compact argument of 
Federalist 84.  James Wilson, for instance, argued at the Pennsylvania Ratify-
ing Convention that “the supreme, absolute and uncontrollable authority, 
remains with the people,” regardless of whether they have delegated power to 
the government.89  Wilson said, “I recollect no constitution founded on this 
principle: but we have witnessed the improvement, and enjoy the happiness, 
of seeing it carried into practice.”90  Beginning with this principle of sover-
eignty in the people, Wilson concluded that the supreme power  
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. (emphasis added). 
 86. Id. 
 87. James Burgh, Political Disquisitions, in 1 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION: 
MAJOR THEMES 54, 55 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987). 
 88. Id. at 54. 
 89. James Wilson, Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention, in 1 FOUNDERS’ 
CONSTITUTION: MAJOR THEMES 61, 62 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 
1987). 
 90. Id. 
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resides in the PEOPLE, as the fountain of government; that the people 
have not – that the people mean not – and that the people ought not, to 
part with it to any government whatsoever.  In their hands it remains 
secure.  They can delegate it in such proportions, to such bodies, on 
such terms, and under such limitations, as they think proper.  I agree 
with the members in opposition, that there cannot be two sovereign 
powers on the same subject.91  
According to Wilson, the people are the “fountain” of governmental 
power – the only source of power is the people.   Thus, there is only one sov-
ereign power in a free society: the people.  When they delegate power to gov-
ernment, they are not creating a sovereign power but merely delegating their 
sovereignty to be exercised by a trustee.  Consequently, in the social compact, 
the people necessarily designate the government as the endpoint of the flow 
of power; the government cannot delegate that power on to another body.  
Only the possessors of power can delegate it. 
James Otis argued that “supreme absolute power is originally and ulti-
mately in the people; and they never did in fact freely, nor can they rightfully 
make an absolute, unlimited renunciation of this divine right.  It is ever in the 
nature of the thing given in trust . . . .”92  Like Wilson and Hamilton, Otis 
argued that the people are always the source of “supreme absolute power,” 
and that there can never be a renunciation of this sovereignty.  Rather, the 
power delegated to government is “given in trust.”  Because the government 
only holds political power in trust, it does not truly possess the power in total. 
Social compact principles define both the relationship between the peo-
ple and their representatives and the limits imposed upon the latter.  These 
principles create a relationship of superior-subordinate when power is dele-
gated from the sovereign people to their agents.  The people, as sovereign, are 
superior to the government, which is their subordinate and trustee.  Only one 
who possesses power (who is the sovereign) can delegate that power to an 
agent.  To claim that Congress can delegate power is to also claim that Con-
gress is the sovereign – not the people.  It would assume, contrary to the prin-
ciples of the Founders, that governments possess power rightfully by nature, 
rather than by consent.  In short, the people would be unjustly deprived of 
their sovereignty if their subordinate and trustee delegated power to another 
entity.  It is worth noting that this view of the social compact comports with 
the basic principles of agency law during the founding period and that early 
American statements on the nondelegation doctrine linked the principle to 
agency law rather than separation of powers, democratic accountability, or 
mere constitutional text.93 
 
 91. Id. 
 92. James Otis, The Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved, in 1 THE 
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION: MAJOR THEMES 52, 52 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Ler-
ner eds., 1987). 
 93. See, e.g., JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF AGENCY § 14 
(1839). 
14
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 4 [2016], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol81/iss4/8
2016] PEOPLE SURRENDER NOTHING 1017 
In short, according to the Framers’ political philosophy, the people are 
the only rightful source of sovereignty, and they cannot relinquish their sov-
ereignty.  The people delegate authority to the government to act for the sake 
of the public good, but they surrender nothing.  The government never pos-
sesses power but only holds it as a delegate in trust.  Therefore, the govern-
ment cannot delegate the power that is given to it by the people, for it is not 
possible to delegate something that one does not possess in the first place.  If 
it were maintained that Congress may delegate the power granted to it by the 
people, that position would be irreconcilable with the clear view of the 
Founders that the people are the only rightful source of sovereignty and thus 
the only proper source of delegated power.  Accordingly, the theory of the 
social compact, and not the idea of the separation of powers, is the rightful 
starting point for grasping the theory of the nondelegation doctrine. 
Understanding the connection between social compact theory and non-
delegation enables us to understand the nondelegation principle implicit in 
the constitutional text.  The Vesting Clause of Article I clearly states that “the 
legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress.”94  This lan-
guage prohibits Congress from transferring legislative power to an authority 
that is not the Congress.  Clearly, in short, the constitutional text supports this 
reading of the Founders’ political theory, but only after beginning with that 
theory can we discern the meaning of the Constitution’s text. 
In recent years, scholars have come closer to unearthing the social com-
pact foundations of the nondelegation doctrine.95  Most prominent among 
these scholars is Philip Hamburger, who argues, 
[T]he difficulty is not delegation, but subdelegation.  By means of the 
Constitution, the people delegate power to government.  Accordingly, 
when Congress purports to give its legislative power to the executive, 
the question is not whether the principal [i.e., the people] can delegate 
the power, but whether the agent [i.e., Congress] can subdelegate it.96 
Hamburger emphasizes the principal-agent relationship that undergirds 
social compact theory.  The people are the principal, and the government the 
agent.  Only principals may delegate, and since the people do not alienate 
their power, the government cannot become a principal and therefore may not 
further delegate.97  Although Hamburger does not discuss delegation in terms 
of social compact theory, his framing of the debate as an issue of subdelega-
tion is perfectly compatible with the analysis of social compact theory in this 
Part, which attempts to explain more fully the roots of the principal-agent 
relationship between the people and the government in terms of popular sov-
ereignty.  Social compact theory also adds an important corollary to the prin-
 
 94. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
 95. See generally Lawson, Delegation, supra note 63. 
 96. HAMBURGER, supra note 2, at 377. 
 97. Id. 
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cipal-agent theory undergirding the nondelegation doctrine.  According to 
agency law, an agent may subdelegate power but only if it is explicitly au-
thorized by the principal.  Social compact theory declares, however, that the 
people may never alienate their sovereignty, and therefore they may never 
authorize the government to subdelegate the powers they vest in it.  There-
fore, a close examination of the Framers’ understanding of the social compact 
enables us to see the question of delegation as an issue of fundamental princi-
ple, rather than a mere legal arrangement between a principal and an agent, 
and it also illustrates the Framers’ own commitment to this principle in their 
own words.98 
III.  REPUBLICANISM, REPRESENTATION, AND NONDELEGATION 
While the nondelegation doctrine was primarily grounded in the theory 
of the social compact, it is also buttressed by a related principle: republican-
ism.99  There was a broad consensus during the framing and ratification of the 
Constitution that it established a republic, rather than a democracy.  Two of 
the most famous Federalist essays, numbers 10 and 39, addressed the central-
ity of republicanism to the defenders of the Constitution.  In Federalist 10, 
Madison distinguished between a republic and a “pure democracy” and ex-
plained the advantages of the former over the latter.100  He was even more 
emphatic in Federalist 39, proclaiming that “no other form [than a republic] 
would be reconcilable with the genius of the people of America; with the 
fundamental principles of the revolution; or with that honorable determina-
tion, which animates every votary of freedom, to rest all our political experi-
ments on the capacity of mankind for self-government.”101  Madison admitted 
in his public defense of the Constitution that unless it set up a republic, “its 
advocates must abandon it as no longer defensible.”102 
But this claim raised an immediate question: what does it mean to estab-
lish a republican form of government?  How should we define a republic?  
Madison admitted that political theorists had not come to a consensus on its 
 
 98. Hamburger does note that the issue of subdelegation was an issue of funda-
mental principle in his analysis.  For instance, he writes that it “turned on the central 
question of modern government, whether power arises from the people or from gov-
ernment.”  Id. at 385. 
 99. As Hamburger explains, “Considered from a slightly different angle, the 
people’s delegation of legislative power to their elected legislature was the very na-
ture of republican government.”  Id.  He goes on, “[T]he principle of delegation and 
its implications for subdelegation are the foundation of republican government and 
constitutional limits.”  Id. at 402. 
 100. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 62 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) 
[hereinafter MADISON, FED. 10]. 
 101. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 250 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) 
[hereinafter MADISON, FED. 39]. 
 102. Id. 
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essential characteristics.103  “Were an answer to this question to be sought,” 
he explained, “in the application of the term by political writers . . . no satis-
factory one would ever be found.”104  So Madison offered his own definition.  
Earlier, in Federalist 10, he called a “Republic . . . a Government in which 
the scheme of representation takes place.”105  By representation he meant “the 
delegation of the Government . . . to a small number of citizens elected by the 
rest.”106  Hamilton used the same language in the previous essay, calling “the 
representation of the people in the legislature by deputies of their own elec-
tion” one of the great improvements in modern political science.107 
In short, elected representation in the legislature characterizes republi-
can governments.  Madison argued that “[t]he elective mode of obtaining 
rulers is the characteristic policy of republican government” for maintaining 
the wisdom and virtue of their officers.108  Madison offered his most system-
atic definition of republicanism in Federalist 39.  There, he wrote: 
[W]e may define a republic to be, or at least may bestow that name on, 
a government which derives all its powers directly or indirectly from 
the great body of the people; and is administered by persons holding 
their offices during pleasure, for a limited period, or during good be-
havior.  It is essential to such a government that it be derived from the 
great body of the society, not from an inconsiderable proportion, or a 
favored class of it. . . . It is sufficient for such a government that the 
persons administering it be appointed, either directly or indirectly, by 
the people; and that they hold their appointments [during pleasure, for 
a limited period, or during good behavior.]109   
In this convoluted definition, Madison twice explains that a republican 
government’s powers must be “derived” from the “great body” of the citizen-
ry.110  While his meaning is not entirely clear, it seems that he was referring 
either to the original establishment of the government through a social com-
pact, or to the regular filling of government offices through election, or both.  
In any of these interpretations, however, the connection between the people 
and their officers is paramount.  A republican government receives its powers 
from the people.  Either to confirm or to clarify this point, Madison explicitly 
says that “the persons administering it [must] be appointed, either directly or 
indirectly, by the people.”111  The connection between the people and their 
 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. MADISON, FED. 10, supra note 100, at 62. 
 106. Id. 
 107. THE FEDERALIST NO. 9, at 51 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 
1961). 
 108. THE FEDERALIST NO. 57, at 384 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
 109. MADISON, FED. 39, supra note 101, at 250. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
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rulers, through elections, is central to Madison’s definition of republicanism, 
both in Federalist 39 and throughout The Federalist essays.112 
The modern administrative state is predicated in part upon the idea of a 
neutral civil service, which derives its powers not from the people through 
elections but from an impartial examination that measures its competence to 
administer a specific program or statute.  To the extent that the officials who 
serve in the bureaucracy are making laws, their activities are not only incom-
patible with the theory of a social compact, but also with the basic principle 
of republicanism, which demands that power is derived from the people 
through elected representatives. 
Defenders of the modern administrative state might respond by noting 
that because Madison’s definition of republicanism allows for appointment of 
officers “directly or indirectly,” and because administrators are indirectly 
appointed, the administrative state is compatible with republicanism.  The 
first difficulty with this counterargument is that the people do not even indi-
rectly appoint most administrative officers.  While many officers in the top 
ranks of the bureaucracy are political appointees who possess an indirect 
election from the people, the overwhelming majority of agency officials – 
including many who exercise significant policymaking authority – are not. 
Let us assume for argument’s sake, however, that administrative officers 
are indirectly appointed.  It might also be asserted that Madison’s definition 
of republicanism, which allows for indirect appointment of officers, actually 
sanctions lawmaking by indirectly elected administrative officials.  After all, 
Madison himself explains that republics have the advantage of representatives 
who can “refine and enlarge the public views” by filtering them through rep-
resentatives who can resist public opinion.113  In his most famous explanation 
of this feature of representation, Madison wrote that a Senate with long terms 
of office would provide “a defense to the people against their own temporary 
errors and delusions.”114  Similarly, Alexander Hamilton argued in Federalist 
71 that “[t]he republican principle demands, that the deliberate sense of the 
community should govern the conduct of those to whom they entrust the 
management of their affairs; but it does not require an unqualified complai-
sance to every sudden breeze of passion, or to every transient impulse” of 
public opinion.115  Given that the Framers expected representatives to be able 
to resist, refine, and enlarge public opinion, perhaps their theory of republi-
canism has room for disinterested administrative officers who can make deci-
 
 112. Id.  Of course, the people do not have to elect all government employees, 
either directly or indirectly.  Those employees who do not exercise significant politi-
cal authority are not “officers” and therefore can be appointed outside of the popular 
mechanisms required for appointment or election of those who do exercise political 
authority. 
 113. MADISON, FED. 10, supra note 100, at 62. 
 114. MADISON, FED. 63, supra note 59, at 425. 
 115. THE FEDERALIST NO. 71, at 482 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 
1961). 
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sions on behalf of the people, even if the people are not involved in putting 
them into office. 
However, this interpretation of republicanism is at odds with basic 
statements elucidating the Framers’ own understanding of a republic.  For 
Madison, republicanism demanded not only an electoral connection between 
the people and all political officers, but also that those who make the laws 
have a special, direct connection to the people through frequent elections.  As 
he explained in Federalist 52 in addressing the term lengths of members of 
the House of Representatives: 
As it is essential to liberty that the government in general, should have 
a common interest with the people; so it is particularly essential that 
the branch of it under consideration, should have an immediate de-
pendence on, & an intimate sympathy with the people.  Frequent elec-
tions are unquestionably the only policy by which this dependence and 
sympathy can be effectually secured.116  
Officers who reside in the legislative branch, unlike those in the execu-
tive or judiciary, must have an “immediate dependence on” the people for 
their power.  While Madison indicated in Federalist 39 that republicanism 
only requires either a direct or an indirect relationship between the people and 
their officers, in Federalist 52, he further specifies that lawmaking must be 
performed by those immediately dependent upon the people.  This may ex-
plain why Madison advocated direct election of both the House of Represent-
atives and the Senate at the Constitutional Convention, as well as why he 
only half-heartedly defended indirect election of U.S. Senators in Federalist 
62.  
Representatives in the legislature must not only be elected, but they also 
must be immediately dependent on the people in order to preserve liberty.  
Republicanism, in other words, demands an electoral connection between the 
people and all of their officers, and it also requires an immediate relationship 
between the people and those who exercise lawmaking authority.  Adminis-
trative officers lack that connection.  At the very least, they clearly lack an 
immediate connection to the people that is a necessary condition for lawmak-
ing.  The delegation of legislative power to administrative officers, therefore, 
violates not only social compact theory, but also republicanism. 
IV.  IMPLICATIONS 
This Article argues that the nondelegation doctrine is a cardinal princi-
ple of American constitutionalism, and that it is derived not from the separa-
tion of powers, democratic accountability, or the text of the Constitution, but 
from social compact theory and republicanism.  The modern administrative 
state, by vesting lawmaking powers in the hands of administrative officers 
 
 116. THE FEDERALIST NO. 52, at 355 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
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who are not representatives of the people and who are not given legislative 
power by the people in the Constitution, threatens the social compact and the 
principle of republican government.  But this is only true if administrative 
officers are exercising legislative power.  How can we know whether the 
powers wielded by bureaucrats are legislative or executive? 
The application of the theory discussed above is beyond the scope of 
this Article.  One way to consider the implications of the theory is to see how 
it was applied in the early years of American history, in specific legislative 
debates and statutes.  Another way is to examine various settled definitions of 
legislative power that have been offered by political theorists from the found-
ing period.  While the Framers knew that it was impossible to offer a fully 
satisfactory definition of law, they believed that the contours of legislative 
power could be defined in a way that distinguished it from executive and 
judicial power.  Madison acknowledged in Federalist 37 that “no skill in the 
science of Government has yet been able to discriminate and define, with 
sufficient certainty, its three great provinces, the Legislative, Executive and 
Judiciary.”117  Yet he also affirmed that “[l]aw is defined to be a rule of ac-
tion.”118  Alexander Hamilton announced in Federalist 75 that “[t]he essence 
of the legislative authority is to enact laws, or, in other words, to prescribe 
rules for the regulation of the society.”119  In spite of the difficulty in distin-
guishing between legislative and executive power, the Framers attempted to 
provide guidelines that would at least allow for application of the nondelega-
tion principle in clear cases.  Madison himself would argue in a delegation 
debate in Congress in 1792 that while he “saw some difficulty in drawing the 
exact line between subjects of legislative and ministerial deliberations[,] . . . 
such a line most certainly existed.”120 
This Article’s goal is modest – to establish that there is a nondelegation 
principle in the U.S. Constitution, and that it is ultimately derived not from 
separation of powers theory, accountability, or simply the text of the docu-
ment, but that it flows from social compact theory and republicanism.  It will 
always be difficult to determine when this principle is violated in practice.  
Applying the doctrine to specific cases will require practical judgment in-
formed by constitutional history and clear definitions that distinguish legisla-
tive and executive power.  But most fundamentally, it will require clarity 
about what the nondelegation principle says and why it is worth enforcing to 
preserve the sovereignty of the people and a republican form of government. 
 
 117. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 235 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
 118. Id. 
 119. THE FEDERALIST NO. 75, at 504 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 
1961). 
 120. 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 700 (1792). 
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